Reinhardt, Guenther (Günther) (1904-1968)

Reinhardt, Guenther (Günther) (1904-1968)
Jan 21, 17

http://documentstalk.com/wp/reinhardt-guenther-gunther-1904-1968/#fnref-2964-6

Reinhardt, Guenther (Günther) (1904-1968)
Biographies, References

A German-born writer who was a free-lance journalist before World War II and also served as a government consultant and private investigator.

Reinhardt was born in 1905 in Mannheim into a German banking family. Brought up in Switzerland and Germany, he graduated from the Royal College in Mannheim in 1922 and received a B.S. from the city’s State University of Economics three years later. He came to the United States in 1925 and reportedly did some post-graduate studies at Columbia University. His first job in New York was reportedly with a bank, but he became a freelance journalist in 1932 and wrote for various Swiss and American publications until 1945. Reinhardt was a correspondent in Washington and New York for Der Bund of Berne, Switzerland and wrote a syndicated column on foreign affairs for the McClure newspapers in the United States. He was also a contributor to The New York Daily News, Life, Look and other American magazines. 1

At the same time, Reinhardt worked as a consultant and investigator for several United States Government agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from 1936 to 1943. Reinhardt’s connections to various banking and civic groups secured him a commission to conduct an investigation into Germany’s likely future international relations. He turned over to the U.S. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization the information he uncovered about Nazi activities in the United States — and subsequently became involved with the American special services. In 1934, he reportedly acted as a liaison between the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities (commonly known as the McCormack-Dickstein Committee) — which was authorized to investigate Nazi propaganda and certain other propaganda activities — and the FBI. 2

Reinhardt wrote about his connection with the FBI in the 1930s and early 1940s in a book published in 1953. 3 In an FBI FOIA file released in April 2009, Guenther appears as an FBI “confidential informant” as of mid-1942. 4 By Reinhardt’s own account, as of 1941 he was also “part of a secret United States operation” which he described as an “investigative body” with “powers stemming directly from the White House.” 5 By combining a few clues, it becomes apparent that Reinhardt was working for the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) – the nation’s first peacetime non-departmental intelligence organization, founded in July 1941 and known at the time as the Donovan Committee. Beginning in early 1942, after the COI split into two branches, the R&A branch came under the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Click here to read more of Reinhardt’s story.

During World War II (from 1942 to 1945), Reinhardt was active in intelligence operations in Latin America and Europe. After the end of the war, he served with the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Europe in 1946-1947.

By one account, “Reinhardt was an enthusiastic and dedicated agent in Europe.” However, he soon began to show signs of stress and fatigue as he realized that the whole intelligence system was corrupt. By the summer of 1947, he realized that his career with the CIC was in jeopardy, as his superiors had secretly arranged to send him home. His outrage over this development led to his writing “two memos, known as the Reinhardt memos,” which “accused the CIC of widespread corruption and incompetence” and described the U.S. Army’s practice of smuggling valuables from Germany into the United States. 6 After his return to the United States in December 1947, Reinhardt became a special consultant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army. In 1948-1949, he served as an interpreter at the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals.

Returning once again to the United States, Reinhardt became the chief private investigator for Bartley C. Crum, the San Francisco lawyer and co-publisher of the New York Star. From 1960 to 1963, he worked for the Silas R. Franz Company, the New York insurance investigators. According to his New York Times obituary, throughout that time he supplied various state agencies, including the state liquor authority, with information about the alleged underworld control and homosexual patronage of bars and nightclubs. 7 In the course of the latter activity, Reinhardt was arrested in New York City in early 1963 with files from the New York State Liquor Authority and charged with the theft of its records. At that time, he was described by the chairman of that authority as “a volunteer informer who gave us a lot of accurate information and some that was pure fantasy.” Although Reinhardt had “been around [the Authority] for a long time,” he reportedly had never been on the authority’s staff. 8

Besides being the author of Crime Without Punishment: The Secret Soviet Terror Against America (1953), Reinhardt was also, according to The New York Times, an author of The Jews in Nazi Germany and The Source Materials for Psychological Warfare. 9 However, I have been unable to verify this claim.

Guenther Reinhardt’s obituary in The New York Times, December 3, 1968; Reinhardt’s brief bio in You Americans: Fifteen Foreign Press Correspondents Report Their Impressions of the United States and its People, by B. P. Adams, Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1939, p. 144. ↩

The Nazi Hydra in America, by Glen Yeadon: Nazi Gold, Part 4: Corruption Overtakes Safehaven, © 2001-2004, http://www.spiritone.com/~gdy52150/main.html ↩
Crime Without Punishment: The Secret Soviet Terror Against America, by Guenther Reinhardt, New York: New American Library, 1953, pp. 17-18. ↩

Ludwig Lore: Communist Activities, report made in New York City, June 3, 1942; report on Lore’s death and subsequent negotiations for purchase of his files by the FBI, July 14, 1942, in Ludwig Lore FBI FOIA file, NY File No. 100-33352, PDF pp. 1-2, 12-15, courtesy of Jeff Kisseloff, April 2009. ↩
Guenther Reinhardt, Op. Cit., p. 17. ↩

Nazi Gold: The Sensational Story of the World’s Greatest Robbery – and the Greatest Criminal Cover-Up, by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, London: Panther, 1984, pp. 346-350; The Nazi Hydra in America, Op. Cit. ↩
The New York Times, Op. Cit. ↩
The New York Times, April 9, 1963. ↩
The New York Times, December 3, 1968. ↩

Studies in Intelligence (2003) Kurt Waldheim and the Central Intelligence Agency, by Kevin C. Ruffner,
Nov 27, 16

Studies in Intelligence (2003)

Kurt Waldheim and the Central IntelligenceAgency (U)

by Kevin C. Ruffner,

Kevin C. Ruffner is in theCIA Directorate of Intelligence.(U)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BYCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSOURCES METHODS EXEMPT 10113828NAZI MAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACTDATE 2003 2008

http://numbers-stations.com/cia/Studies%20In%20Intelligence%20Nazi%20-%20Related%20Articles/STUDIES%20IN%20INTELLIGENCE%20NAZI%20-%20RELATED%20ARTICLES_0018.pdf

In 1986, the world discovered that Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary General of the United NatioWehrmacht staff officer in the Balkans during World War II.While ns and a candidate for Austria's presidency, had served as Waaldheim had never denied that he had been in the German army, his 1985 autobiography left the impression that his military service had been curtailed after he received wounds in late 1941 on the Russian frontand that he had gone on to law chool in Vienna. 1 Forty 3iearsafter World War II, however,investigations uncovered the fact that Oberleutnant Waldheim had held staff positions in army-level commands in Yugoslavia and Greece until the end of the war.The brutal nature of the waragainst local partisans and Allied commandos in the Balkans, coupled with Nazi Germany's violent treatment of civilians,s including Jews, and Italian prisoners of war after 1943, raised questions about Waldheim's own activities and his knowledge of the German atrocities. 2 (U)

Allegations about Waldheim's military service prompted US Attorney General Edward Meese to direct the Office of Special Investigations(OSI) in the US Department of Justice to open an investigation in March 1986 to determine whether he should be excluded from entering the United State under the provisions of the "Holtzman Amendment." 3 A year later,Meese announced that Waldheim had been placed on the "WatchList" of war criminals excluded from entry into the United States.In this unprecedented move, the US government formally prohibited Waldheim, who had been elected Austria's president in June 1986, from visiting America in either an official or unofficial capacity. 4 To this day, the United States excludes Waldheim. (U)

From start to finish, the Waldheim case was a public affairs disaster for the Central Intelligence Agency. It represented a failure on several levels that stretched over decades. Incomplete research into his background, delays in releasing a key document, and a cavalier attitude toward members of Congress unnecessarily raised suspicions that the Agency was covering up a clandestine relationship with the Austrian statesman. (U)

The Waldheim experience yieldsimportant lessons. Chances arehigh that leaders with unsavorypasts will rise to prominence inthe 21st century. Evaluation oftheir suitability as world leaderswill rest on painstaking historicalresearch. (U)

Little Early Interest inWaldheim (U)

The Agency did not considerWaldheim of intelligence interestuntil after he was elected SecretaryGeneral of the UnitedNations in late 1971. He had anormal, if not distinguished,career as an Austrian diplomatin the immediate postwardecades. Agency files contained afew scattered references to hiswork in the Austrian ForeignMinistry during the 1950s, but nothorough background check wasrun on him until he rose to thetop leadership position at theUN. A Directorate of Operations(DO) "201 file" (also called a"name file" or "personality file")was not even created for Waldheimuntil January 1972.5(S//NF)

In connection with Waldheim'svarious diplomatic responsibilities, the Directorate ofIntelligence (DI) published some20 routine biographic profiles ofthe statesman between 1964 and1987. The first profile, writtenwhen he was Austria's ambassadorto the United Nations, didnot even list his military service.'When he became SecretaryGeneral, his DI biographic reportnoted that he had served in theGerman army and had beenwounded. This profile went on tocomment:

Waldheim is a devoted friend ofthe United States, and he hasbeen very cooperative and helpfulin promoting US interests.When he was Foreign Minister,his personal cooperation wasparticularly effective in confidentiallyworking out Austrianformulations acceptable to theUnited States covering such subjectsas Vietnam, the Middle Eastand European security His longservice in the United States hasgiven him an understanding ofAmerican thinking and foreignpolicy objectives. 7 (U)

In early January 1972, shortlyafter Waldheim's swearing in asUN chief, the CIA queried itsclandestine sources about rumorsthat he had been a member of theNazi party.' One source denied"emphatically" that Waldheim had ever belonged to theNational Socialist German Workers'Party, or NSDAP, althoughthe source knew that Waldheimhad served as a staff officer inthe German army. According tothe report from this source, Waldheim"never had to make aserious decision himself and healways had superiors who wouldtake the responsibilities for decisionand action." He was, in thisagent's words, a "colorlessbureaucrat."' (S//NF)

Headquarters took other seepsthat year to check on Waldheim,requesting its base in C .2 tocheck with the State Department'sBerlin Documents Centerto see if he had a Nazi partymembership file." The basereported that while there werethree men with the same name in the Nazi party, it found no tracethat the UN Secretary Generalhad joined the party "Wish [to]point out," C L cabled, "[that]negative trace at BDC not absoluteguarantee that individualbeing traced was not member OS[Austrian] NSDAP. Although itis presumed that master NSDAPcard file [is] complete there [is]no way [of] being positive thissource." n (S//NF)

The Agency's Station in C..also queried a source who "reiteratedthat he considers it veryunlikely that Waldheim [was]member NSDAP, pointing outthat Waldheim's father [was]fired from his post by Nazis."This source added that "therumor [of Waldheim's Nazi membership]might have arisen fromstories (which he could not vouchfor) that Waldheim during WWIIservice as a staff officer in Parishad reputation as 'knowing Paris'and arranging gay evenings forVIPs." The Station could not findany information detailing Waldheim'swartime service andconcluded that it was unlikely hecould have been a Nazi, given hispostwar duties in the AustrianForeign Ministery. 12 (S//NF)

After this initial examination inJanuary 1972, the Agency did nottake any further steps to investigateWaldheim's wartime service.Instead, DO files indicate that the CIA simply kept tabs on theAustrian leader's official travel,his personal habits, and theactivities of his staff. (S//NF)

The Media Stir the Pot (U)

Waldheim's World War II activitiesattracted occasionalattention in the United States.The New Republic published twoarticles on the United Nationsand Waldheim in 1980, whichdrew the attention of Stephen J.Solarz, a Democratic Congressmanfrom New York." He wroteWaldheim and Adm. StansfieldTurner, then the Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI), in late1980 with several questionsabout the Secretary General'srecord." On the last day of 1980,Frederick P. Hitz of the CIA'sOffice of Legislative Counselreplied to Solarz: "We believethat Waldheim was not a memberof the Nazi Youth Movement,nor was he involved in anti-Jewishactivities." Hitz then provided Solarz with a brief synopsisof Waldheim's militaryrecord, commenting that he hadentered the German army at theage of 20 in 1939 and then servedas a staff officer with the 45thInfantry Division in Poland andFrance. Hitz continued thatWaldheim's "service with [the45th) Division ended in 1941when he received a leg wound" inthe Soviet Union. After alengthy recovery, Waldheim wasdischarged from the Germanarmy and returned to law schoolin Vienna, Hitz told Solarz.Waldheim received his degree in1944 and entered the ForeignMinistry in 1945. The Agencycould not find any indicationsthat Waldheim had "participateddirectly or indirectly in anti-Jewishactivities."" (U)

New Information (U)

After telling Solarz what it knewas of 1980, the CIA did not follow up on fresh clandestinereports in 1981 that raised newquestions about Waldheim'swhereabouts from 1941 to 1945.A source provided a letter from aWest German publisher thatclaimed that Waldheim served asan "aid[e]" to a German generalon the Eastern Front who commandeda unit of RussianCossacks fighting for the ThirdReich. An additional reportstated that Waldheim Commandeda special unit behindSoviet lines and that the Russianshad captured him.According to this source, theSoviets released Waldheim whilethey executed other Germanofficers for war crimes. Consequently,"Waldheim has neverforgotten what the Soviets did forhim, and this would explain hislenience toward the USSR." 16(Si/1\1F)

Headquarters apparently dismissed these reports. In a message from Washington to various stations in December 1981,the Agency reiterated its faith in the standard biographic line:"The fact that Waldheim has enjoyed a public career of some35 years without having been'exposed' in the past through any associations with the Nazis, suggeststh at such allegations have no basis."" The Agency held tothis understanding of Waldheim's military activities into themid 1980s. (S//NF)

Murky Web Unravels (U)

In 1986, the World Jewish Congress(WJC) and the New YorkTimes, responding to pressreports and political gossip inAustria about Waldheim, delvedmore deeply into captured Germanrecords at the National Archives and quickly foundincriminating information. (U)

Over the next three years, theWJC, OSI in the Department ofJustice, the Austrian government,the British government,and an independent panel of militaryhistorians conductedseparate investigations, whichrevealed that Waldheim's militaryservice had been far moreextensive than he had led theworld to believe. In an unprecedentedreport, OSI concludedthat Waldheim had "assisted, orotherwise participated in the persecution.. . [ofl person[s] because of race, religion, nationalorigin or political opinion." TheDepartment of Justice also citedWaldheim's participation in thetransfer of civilians to the SS forslave labor; the mass deportationof civilians to death camps;the utilization of anti-Semiticpropaganda; the mistreatmentand execution of Allied prisonersof war; and the reprisal executionof civilians. OSI's findingsprompted the Attorney Generalto place the Austrian leader onthe immigration Watch List in1987. 18 (U)

Seeking Explanations (U)

The extent of Waldheim's servicein the German army in the Balkans became abundantly clearafter these investigations, yetquestions lingered as to how hehad avoided detection for somany years. Hitz's letter to CongressmanSolarz in December1980, essentially exoneratingWaldheim, created the impressionthat the Agency sought toprotect the Austrian diplomat.Solarz, testifying at a Congressionalhearing in 1986, blastedthe CIA's response because "it looked as if it had come off Mr. Waldheim's xerox machine."The Agency's investigation,Solarz declared, "was incompetentat best and indifferent atworst."' (U)

New information fueled the confusion about Waldheim's relationship to the Americans:

• In 1948, the US Army had placed Waldheim on its Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS)while the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWWC) indicted him for murder at the insistence of the Yugoslays. It was uncertain how Waldheim had evaded these charges.

• In 1986, Karl Gruber, Austria's first postwar Foreign Minister,acknowledged that Fritz Molden, an Austrian who worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and was DCI Allen Dulles's son-in-law, had irst proposed that the young Austrian lawyer join the diplomatic corps only months after the war's end. 20 Molden further more claimed that he had appointed Waldheim to this new post not only after checking with Austrian officials as to Waldheim's Nazi record, but also with American occupation authorities, including the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the OSS.21

• Further examination of Waldheim's postwar actions revealed that he had supported the Yugoslays and the Soviets on a number of issues, lending credence to suspicions that more than one nation wanted to protecthim. (U)

CIA Missteps (U)

As revelations about Waldheim 'sun savory background mounted,the Agency compounded its bland December 1980 letter to Congressman Solarz with an unfortunate series of blunders.Congressional figures demanded that the CIA provide answers to the allegations that Waldheim had enjoyed a special relationship with American intelligence.Representative Lee H. Hamilton,chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Representative Solarz, and Senator Alphonse D'Amato all asked for full access to the Agency's holdings.22 The Agency's response was perfunctory—it simply reiterated the known "facts" in its Congressional correspondence and in briefings to both over-,sight committees in Congress. 23In one case, the CIA even relegated a request from Solarz to the channels of the Agency's Freedom of Information Act(FOIA) office. 24 (U)

As Congressional interest mounted, however, the CIA undertook an expanded search, locating several additional documents that contained references to a "Waldheim" that were not in Kurt Waldheim's 201 file. 25 At first, the Agency could not as certain whether they referred to the Austrian president. One documentin particular, quickly drew Congressional interest and latermedia attention. A British intelligence brief from 26 April 1945—known as Security Intelligence Middle East (S.I.M.E.)Report Number 4—contained the interrogation of Hans Jurgen Kirchner, a captured German intelligence officer. In the report,Kirchner listed some 238 German intelligence personnel stationed in the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe. 26 An unremarkable document overall, the S.I.M.E. report made a short reference on page 47 to Oberleutnant Waldheim. Kirchner briefly described Waldheimas a "subordinate officer toWARNSTORFF in SALONIKA'.and provided some general physical characteristics, such as his height, age, hair, and eye color.Immediately below the Waldheimentry is a similar, although slightly more detailed, description of Oberstleutnant Warnstorff.(C)

The British had provided theS.I.M.E. report to the Americans at the end of the war. It was filed at OSS Headquarters in Washington and later transferred to the new CIA in 1947. It had resided in the CIA's files for decades after the war, but had not been cross-referenced orplaced in Waldheim's 201 file when it was created in 1972.Because of its British origins, there port had not been transferred to the National Archives in the1980s with the bulk of OSS holdings.It is unlikely that thisdocument would have been scrutinizedat all without the worldwide interest in Waldheimin 1986. (C)

The S.I.M.E. Report Becomesa Cause Célèbre (U)

The CIA provided details of the report's contents in response to Congressional inquiries in 1986,but it refused to release the report in its entirety to FOIA requesters. The Agency explained that it could not declassify the report because Executive Order 12356 and USCode 403g of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 required the CIA to protect foreign government information in addition to protecting sources and methods. 27 (C)

Having been apprised of the report's general contents in 1986, a year later Congressman Solarzdemanded that the Agency release the document to the public. "I f ind this information," Solarz declared,"both surprising and distressing inlight of the assurances given me in1980 that no such reporting existed." 288 In late 1987, David D.Gries, director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, told Solarz that"the 1945 document [the S.I.M.E.report] you cite is not relevant, nor does it speak to your concerns. Byway of explanation, we did have the reference to an Oberleutnant Waldheim. when we responded to your 1980 request. However,"Gries admitted, "at that time, all other available information placed Kurt Waldheim in a civilian capacity in 1945 after being wounded in 1942. The one incomplete reference,which was extracted in our 1986 letter to you, was not adequate evidence to contradict all other known information on the then-Secretary General, and so our 1980 letter to you did not mentionit."29(S)

Knowledge of the existence of the1945 report quickly spread. The Agency refused requests from theWorld Jewish Congress to releaseit. In an effort to bolster Waldheim'scase that he was not aNazi war criminal, the AustrianEmbassy in Washington telephonedthe CIA in October 1987and asked that the Americansprovide a copy of the reports°According to a memo written byLee S. Strickland, the Agency'sInformation and Privacy Coordinator:"The Embassy was highlyconcerned about the recent spateof news articles which have variously,but all erroneously, statedthat the CIA knew Kurt Waldheimwas involved in Naziactivities and/or was an agent ofAmerican intelligence." After alengthy discussion, Stricklandconvinced Christian Prosel, theAustrian counselor, that his governmentshould make a formalrequest through their ambassadoror liaison officer. 31 Thefollowing day, the AustrianEmbassy passed a note to theState Department expressing itsdesire to receive a full orredacted copy of the report. 32 (U)

The official Austrian request presenteda new problem for theAgency because it still had anobligation to protect intelligenceprovided by a foreign government from dissemination toanother foreign power. TheAgency approached its Britishcounterparts with an unusualrequest: Could the British permitthe United States to providethe Austrians with a copy of the1945 S.I.M.E. report pertainingto Waldheim and his superiorofficer? After a week of deliberation,the British governmentagreed to release the portion ofthe report with the brief referencesto Waldheim andWarnstorff. The Americans, however,could only pass thisinformation to the Austrianswith the express indication thatthe material still retained itssecret classification and that itcame only from "an allied government."33 In early November 1987,the CIA passed the sanitized sectionto the State Department fortransfer to the Austrian government.34 (S)

Steady Criticism (U)

Waldheim dismissed the S.I.M.E.report after the Austrian governmentreceived the sanitizedportion. An independent panel ofmilitary historians looking intoWaldheim's role also had littleuse for it s' Despite the overallinsignificance of the references, however, the British press seizedupon leaked information aboutthe 1945 report as evidence thatHer Majesty's Governmentwas refusing to support theWaldheim investigation by withholdingthe entire report. AReuters dispatch quoted anunnamed source that "the UnitedStates cannot, in accordance withits agreement with the British,release the document withoutBritish permission." 36 Indeed, theBritish had apparently lost theS.I.M.E. report in the years afterthe war and the copy in the CIA'sfiles turned out to be the onlysurviving example. In 1988, theDirectorate of Operationsexpressed its overall willingnessto release the entire report providedthat American markingswere removed. The British, however,preferred to "hold firm toprinciple of not releasing anyintel docs, no matter how old orinnocent." (S)

With its hands tied by the British,the CIA absorbed a steadystream of criticism over the years. In 1988, CongressmanSolarz demanded that theAgency reveal the contents of the1945 report and inform him if theOSS had conducted any interrogationsof Waldheim. TheAgency's response was againbland and suggested that Solarzcontact other Federal agencies,such as the National Archivesand the US Army, for answers tohis queries. 38 In 1989, the Britishgovernment clearedWaldheim of any role in thedeaths of British military personnelin Greece during World WarII and finally released a sanitizedversion of the 1945 S.I.M.E.report, but London neglected toinform the CIA of its action.388Consequently, the Agency continuedto withhold the British WorldWar II report until it was finallydeclassified in 2001. By thattime, British intelligence officialshad no interest in theS.I.M.E. report and expressedsurprise that the CIA had kept itunder wraps for so long. (U)

The British exoneration ofWaldheim in 1989 brought about a wave of fresh criticism againstthe CIA. In November of thatyear, A. M. Rosenthal, a columnistfor the New York Times,recited the story of the CIA's1972 check on the then-newSecretary General, the Agency'sletter to Congressman Solarz in1980, and the saga of the 1945British report. Rosenthal quotedRobert E. Herzstein, a Un&ersityof South Carolina historianand author of a newly publishedbook on Waldheim, who asserted:"Now there is proof that theC.I.A. investigated Waldheim,cleared him, declared him to be ofoperational interest and shieldedhim. It did so while having in itsfiles at least one document placingDr. Waldheim in the Balkans,a fact which if published wouldhave unveiled a thirty year coverup."Rosenthal, citingHerzstein's research, urged Congressto open the Agency'sWaldheim file, "or what remainsof it," to determine whether theformer UN Secretary Generalwas an American "operationalasset."48(U)

A week later, the World JewishCongress unveiled its copy of theS.I.M.E. report obtained from"contacts in Europe." "What youhave here," Elan Steinberg, theWJC's executive directordeclared, "is the C.I.A. not onlyconfirming Waldheim's big lie,which is to say his coverup, but adocument showing that the C.I.A.knew and, in fact, has known for40 years that that was a big lie."The World Jewish Congressmaintained that the Agencyknew about Waldheim's "secret"past even as he was confirmed asUN Secretary General in 1971and later when the CIAresponded to Solarz's inquiry.4'(U)

The reaction to the WJC's releasewas immediate. In an articletitled "CIA Held File on WaldheimWar Role," The WashingtonPost claimed that an unidentifiedUS government source hadconfirmed that the documentobtained by the WJC was genuineand had been in the CIA'sfiles. An Agency spokesman,however, offered no comment andsimply replied, "it will taketime to investigate this." TheWashington Post also quotedProf Herzstein about why theCIA had this document, but hadnot reported on Waldheim's militaryservice in the Balkans. "Ihave to assume there was a patternof protection," saidHerzstein. "It is conceivable thatWaldheim could have been anagent of influence or a source of information about KGB influencein the UN secretariat."Herzstein claimed that theAgency's failure to reveal theexistence of the British reportwas the result of "incompetenceor a pattern of protection." 42 (U)

The Push for Disclosure (U)

Following the collapse of communism,public clamor increased forthe release of secret files fromthe Cold War years. Allegations that the Agency had played a rolein the assassination of PresidentJohn F. Kennedy grabbed headlinesafter the release of OliverStone's movie "JFK" in 1992, andlegislation requiring the releaseof relevant files followed.Through the years, the Americanpublic had remained suspiciousabout the CIA's relationship withNazi war criminals, and KurtWaldheim became the key thatunlocked those classified cabinetsat Langley, too. (U)

The first volley of this new campaign appeared in the form of aletter from Elizabeth Holtzman,comptroller of the City of NewYork, to DCI Robert Gates inMarch 1992. 43 Holtzman, aformer Congresswoman and acandidate for the US Senate,requested that the CIA releaseits files on Nazi war criminals.Providing several names(although not Waldheim's), shenoted that the US governmenthad protected Nazi war criminalsand, in some cases, arrangedtheir immigration to the UnitedStates. "In the process ofemploying these people and bringthem to safe haven in the UnitedStates and elsewhere," Holtzmansaid, "laws were broken, lies weretold, and the President, Congress,other government agenciesand the public were deceived.But we still don't know the wholestory," she claimed. "Forty sevenyears after the end of World WarII, it is time for the American people to find out the truth."44(U)

In August 1992, Adm. William 0.Studeman, as Acting DCI, replied to Holtzman's letter, promising hat the Agency would review its files for records on Nazi war criminals and transfer them to the National Archives. He did not provide a timeline for suchaction—the Agency's review of records relating to President Kennedy's death had higher priority—and he cautioned that i7 might be difficult to locate relevant material. 45 Studeman's letter quickly made its way to the New York Times. "In a change of policy that could provide new information about American recruitment of Nazi war criminals after World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency say sit has begun to systematically search its records with the aim of opening long-secret files to historians'scrutiny," the paperreported. 46 (U)

This optimistic announcement soon became mired in controversy. Studeman's letter nadvertently had stated that theAgency had not located any records on one of the individuals requested by Holtzman. This brought a frenzied cry from John Loftus, a former attorney with the Office of Special Investigations,who claimed that he had seen such records while working for the Justice Department.47 After that point, the CIA failed to follow up on Studeman's promise to locate and review records pertaining to Nazis. In the end, theAgency made no effort to do anything about these files. (U)

In May 1994, A. M. Rosenthalagain took up his pen in the editorial pages of the New York Times, musing about "the Waldheim file" and how Waldheim had escaped his past for so many years. Rosenthal again drew upon Prof. Herzstein's research to highlight the gaps in the public's knowledge of the Austrian politician, who had by this time completed his term as president and retired from all official duties. 488 Herzstein maintained that Waldheim "was protected by the US government, provided information in return for thatprotection and profited  from the government's willingness to obliterate his wartime service." 49 (U)

Frustrated with other attempts to obtain the Agency's holdings on Waldheim, Rosenthal urged the US Congress to pass legislation"preventing government agencies from denying information about World War II war crimes." 50 New York Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney took up Rosenthal's and Herzstein's platform in a 12 July 1994 letter to her colleagues on Capitol Hill pushing for a "War Crimes Disclosure Act." Forwarding a copy of Rosenthal's editorial, Maloney expressed shock that "the CIA withheld critical information about Kurt Waldheim's Nazi past from the public." She sought a cosponsor to close the loopholes in the Freedom of Information Act that allowed the Agency to withhold information about war criminals.51(U)

Maloney introduced her bill,cosponsored by six other congressmen,on 12 August 1994. It was referred to three committees in the House of Representatives,but it lacked a companion bill in the Senate. Rosenthal informed the readers of the New York Times that Representative Maloney had introduced the bill. "Itis an overdue piece of legislation,important to justice and history,"he wrote. "The key to the Waldheim file is right there on the table, waiting for Congress to pick it up and use it." 52 (U)

The Agency's Reaction (U)

The CIA opposed the legislation.John Gred 4:4 a member of the Agency's Office of Congressional Affairs, warned that the WarCrimes Disclosure Act wouldstrip the Agency of its ability to protect information under the National Security Act of 1947 and protect the identities of CIA officers." Although Maloney's billfailed to move in the House in the waning hours of the 103rd Congress, she reintroduced it when the new Congress convened in March 1995. This time it had 17 cosponsors, and it began to make its way through hearings. (U)

In the summer of 1996,Rosenthal again led the charge,proclaiming that "for a full half century,with determination and skill, and with the help of the law, US intelligence agencies have kept secret the record of how they used Nazis for so many years, what the agencies got from these services—and what they gave as payback." 64 Once again, he advocated that Congress demand the release of the Federal government's holdings on Waldheim, whom he now described as a possible "bigpower groupie" who worked forall sides during the Cold War. In late September 1996, the House approved the Maloney bill.Daniel P. Moynihan, the powerful New York Senator, took up the drive in the US Senate. (U)

Bad press for the Agency continued.In December 1996, Parade Magazine, a widely distributed insert to Sunday newspapers,claimed: "There are thousands ofNazis still being pursued for war crimes they committed more than 50 years r ago ... [and] the CIA is one of the obstacles to finding those alive today" According to the article, "The Agency intervened in October to weaken the War Crimes Disclosure Act, which would have opened US intelligence files on Nazi war criminals to those engaged in hunting them.Why? National embarrassment.The US helped some Nazis after the war if they were useful infighting the communists." (U)

Congresswoman Maloney's  efforts succeeded when President Clinton signed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246) on 8 October 1998. 56 Earlier that summer, the House had ratified the Senate's version of the bill requiring thedisclosure of records related toNazi war crimes and criminals.The Senate's language called for an interagency working group(IWG) to facilitate the review and release of government records.In January 1999, the President appointed three public members,including Agency critic Elizabeth Holtzman, to this task force to over see the declassification efforts of a number of Federal agencies and departments. r,7 The new members quickly focused on the CIA and its holdings on Kurt Waldheim. (U)

Release of the File (U)

The Agency released its holdingson Waldheim in 2001. He wasincluded in the CIA's first releaseof its Nazi "name file" holdings,which included Adolf Hitler, JosefMengele, Adolf Eichmann, HeinrichMueller, and Klaus Barbie.Waldheim clearly did not fit easilywith this group of major Nazifigures and war criminals; yet,the release of his records was animportant step in the eyes of thepublic and an important clearingof the air for the Agency itself.Steven Garfinkel, chairman ofthe IWG , remarked in April2001: "I have worked with CIAon declassification issues formore than 20 years, and, in myexperience, the level of cooperationthat the IWG has received isunprecedented. That supportincludes the commitment ofDirector George Tenet. Thesedisclosures add significant newinformation about this most criticaljuncture of world andAmerican history."" (U)

Despite the information release,the Austrian diplomat remains acontroversial figure. The declassifieddata proved to be adisappointment to those expectingthem to reveal a relationshipbetween the Agency and theformer UN Secretary General.Waldheim's 201 file contains noinformation to indicate that theUS government had any intelligenceinterest in him prior to hisrise to the top at the United.Nations. The records demonstratedthat the CIA had noaffiliation with Waldheim eitherin postwar Austria or while hewas Secretary Genera1. 59 Nor didhis file provide any leads as toWaldheim's wartime career(beyond the long-awaited USrelease of the 1945 S.I.M.E.report) or information aboutwhether the American governmentsuspected the Soviets or theYugosla ys of using Waldheimafter World War II. The IWG, inits press release in the spring of2001, simply stated that the fileindicated that "former UN SecretaryGeneral Kurt Waldheim wasnot an intelligence resource forthe United States, and the CIAcould not conclude that the Soviet Union used or blackmailedWaldheim withinformation about his Nazipast."'" (U)

Interestingly, the documentrelease turned out to be a noneventin the eyes of the media.61Unlike the high-level attentionthat Rosenthal had given to theWaldheim issue in the editorialpages of the New York Timeswhen the legislation was pending,there was no comparableattention in April 2001. (U)

The American press alsoneglected to pick up on the storythat Austria's foreign minister,Benita Ferrero-Waldner, appealedto Secretary of State Colin Powellin May 2001 to have Waldheim'sname removed from the WatchList. "Our official relations andpolitical cooperation with theUnited States," the foreign ministercommented, "are so good andintensive that a solution in thistiresome issue must be possible!The most recent publication ofofficial (CIA) files underlines thatit is not justified to maintain sucha far-reaching decision." 62 With some embarrassment, the Departmentof State simply announcedthat the "secretary made it clearthat we're not in a position tochange the US government'sdetermination on Mr. Waldheim,and the secretary took no newpositions on the matter." RichardBoucher, Secretary of State Powell'sspokesman, noted that "wethink that the position that he'staken is well justified. CIA filesdon't really provide any new orrelevant information on the case.They don't change our decisionwith respect to his (Wa/dheim)inclusion in the look-out." 63 (1.1)

The Waldheim Matter in Retrospect (U)

The CIA repeatedly showed poor handling of the Waldheim case.Although the Agency and its predecessors had no relationship with the Austrian diplomat, the refusal to declassify information on him in CIA files resulted in the Congressional action forcing theCIA and other Federal agencies and departments to review and release millions of pages of material dating to the earliest days of the CIA and its predecessors. Had the Agency taken steps voluntarily to release information when the Waldheim case exploded on the international scene in1986, it is possible that Congress would never have enacted the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.Because the CIA refused to release selected material on Waldheim and Nazis in general, the US government is now spending millions of dollars and expending scarce manpower resources to do so under a law targeted specifically at one agency.(U)

The Agency's poor track record on Waldheim had begun long before the Austrian's past became controversial in 1986. The fact that the CIA performed only rudimentary checks on Waldheim when he became Secretary General of the United Nations in the early 1970s is inexcusable. Rather than accepting his personal account of his wartime activities—which skimmed from 1942 (after his return home from Russia) until 1945 (when he joined the new Austrian Foreign Ministry)—analysts should have questioned just what was he doing during those crucial missing years. As the tide of the war turned against the Nazis, few German males avoided military service, especially to attend law school. The Agency could have performed a more in-depth examination of Waldheim's military career and his assignments both at the National Archives in Washington and at the French-run Wehrmachtauskunftstelle (the German Wehrmacht Information Office) in West Berlin. While the CIA inquired if Waldheim had been a Nazi party member by checking the NSDAP files in the State Department's Berlin Documents Center, this was an insufficient vetting of such a leading international figure. (U)

To make matters worse, theAgency refused to release the only real record that it had onWaldheim's wartime service—thescanty information listed in the1945 British interrogation report.Once that document surfaced in1986, the CIA should haveworked immediately and intentlywith the British to find a way torelease the S.I.M.E. report. Thereport's innocuous and outdatedinformation far outweighed anyharm that would have resulted inthe 1980s. By failing to arrangefor release of this World War IIreport, the Agency only fueledpublic and Congressional suspicionsthat it sought to shelterWaldheim. (U)

The Agency also adopted a cavalierattitude towards members ofCongress during the Waldheiminvestigations, even telling oneCongressman to file a FOIArequest for the 1945 Britishreport. It maintained this bearingthrough the 1990s, refusingto honor the promise of ActingDCI Studeman to declassifymaterial related to Nazis. As aresult, millions of pages of documentsfrom the 1940s remainedin the CIA's classified vaults.Public pressure forced Congressto break this logjam—at bothgreat cost and untold damage tothe CIA's image. Only after 1998were the American people, atlong last, able to view the finalsecrets from a war 50 yearsearlier. (U )

The Waldheim case should not beseen solely through the prism ofWorld War II or Nazi war crimes.The Agency should heed the lessonsfrom theWaldheim experience because the chances are high that a similarincident will happen again. In theaftermath of the Cold War, a newgeneration of world leaders hascome of age. Some of these menand women may have pasts thatthey want to conceal as theyassume new mantles of leadershipin the 21st century. Somemay wish to hide or obfuscatewhat activities they performed inthe old Soviet Union or its puppetgovernments in Eastern Europe. Others may hold secrets aboutsinister activities in theBalkans or in the Middle East,Africa, Asia, or Latin America;and some may be linked to variousterrorist groups. Intelligenceanalysts need to dig below thesurface and study these individualsin depth. Despite today'sinformation overload, it oftentakes old-fashioned detectivework and historical research topiece together a person's past.The Central Intelligence Agencysimply cannot someone else witha reprehensible past rise to a positionof global prominence. (U)

1 Kurt Waldheim, In the Eye of the Storm:A Memoir (Bethesda, MD: Adler andAdler, 1986). Waldheim's book had beenpublished in England a year earlier. TheGerman-language version of his memoirImGlaspalast der Weltpolitik (Dusseldorfand Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1985)—containsa few more details about his military service,including the fact that he served until1945. Waldheim's other publications—TheChallenge of Peace (London: Weidenfeldand Nicholson, 1980) and Building the FutureOrder: The Search for Peace in an InterdependentWorld (New York, NY: TheFree Press, 1980)—do not discuss his preUNactivities. Waldheim was SecretaryGeneral from 1972-1982. (U)

2 In addition to investigations of Kurt Waldheim carried out by the World Jewish Congress and the Austrian magazine Profit, the Austrian government, the British government, and a panel of military historians conducted separate inquiries.Thames Television also produced a televised "trial" of Waldheim in June 1988 titled "Waldheim: A Commission of Inquiry." Jack Saltman, the show's producer, published his research for Thames Television in Kurt Waldheim—A Case to Answer? (London: Robson Books, 1988). For further information on the Waldheim case, see Richard Bassett, Waldheim and Austria (New York, NY: Viking Press,1989); Alan Levy, The Wiesenthal File (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993); Eli M. Rosenbaum,with William Hoffer, Betrayal: The Untold Story of the Kurt Waldheim Investigation and Cover-Up (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Luc Rosenzweis and Bernard Cohen, Waldheim, trans. by Josephine Bacon (New York, NY: Adam Books, 1987); Simon Wiesenthal, Justice, Not Vengeance (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989); and Harold H. TittmanIII, The Waldheim Affair: Democracy Subverted (Dunkirk: Olin Frederick, 2000).(U)

3 Named after Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman of New York, Public Law 95-549 amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 to incorporate the language and intent of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act and the 1953 Refugee Relief Act to "exclude from admission into the United States aliens who have persecuted any person on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and to facilitate the deportation of such aliens who have been admitted into the United States." United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 95th Congress-Second Session 1978, Vol. 4:Legislative History (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 4700-4716(U)

4 Leslie Maitland Werner,'"Waldheim Barred from Entering U.S. over Role in War," New York Times, 28 April 1987, pp.Al and 28. (U)

5 The Agency opened its "201" file on Kurt Waldheim on 10 January 1972 [ ] 1 GOI byst,ein provides the Agency with a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the DO and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person in a single place. DO components can create such a file and assign aseven-digit file number to an individualwhen there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired on that person. Normally, a 201 file will be opened when a Main Index search reveals substantive information on the individual in five or more documents. The Headquarters 201 file is the official file containing all biographic reporting on and references to the Individual, including personal history and operational assessments.DO Instruction No. 70-41, "The 201 System," 11 August 1994, (S//NF),copy located in CIA History Staff files, Seealso Cable, Director to DO [ ] / C. 11January 1972, Director 219114, f;7iiiiNE), in Kurt Waldheim, File 201-0896881,Records of the Directorate of Operations(hereafter cited as Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records). (S//NF)

6 Biographical profile, "Kurt Waldheim",July 1964, in Kurt Waldheim "CIA NameFile," National Archives and Records Administration,College Park, Maryland(hereafter cited as NARA). (U)

7 Directorate of Intelligence, IntelligenceMemorandum, "Kurt Waldheim of Austria:Secretary General of the United Nations,"January 1972, in "CIA Name File,"NARA. (U)

8 For the first inquiry, see Cable, DO/I C Lto Director, 4 January 1972, DO/I c._,20776, IN 505612, (S//NF), in Waldheim,File 201-0896881, DO Records.(SfiNF)

9 Cable, DO, C_ to Director, 6 January1972, C-, 20787, IN 506467,(S//NF), in Waldheim, File 201-0896881,DO Records. (S//NF)

10 At the end of the war, the US Army haduncovered the membership records of theNazi party just before their destruction.These records subsequently were transferredto Berlin and formed the basis of theArmy's 7771 Document Center. In 1953,the State Department assumed responsibilityfor what became known as the BerlinDocuments Center, or BDC. In addition tosome ten million NSDAP membershipcards, the Center contains thousands ofrecords related to other Nazi organizations,including the service files of SS officersAfter years of discussion, the UnitedStates relinquished control of the BDC tothe German government in 1994. (U)

11 See Cable, Headquarters to l7 January 1972, Director 219136. OUT219436, (S//NF), and Cable,C , toHeadquarters, 12 January 19 rz,15294, IN 511636, (S//NF), both in vvaiahelm,File 201-0896881, DO Records.(S//NF)

12 Cable, C., 3 fn Headquarters, 17 January_1972 C.. —.7 14703, IN 514662,(S//NF). For clarification phmitSltation'evuu. ^f"gay," see Cable, DO C 1 tk20 January 1972, C. —7 vfic$10,IN 61 anA9. (8//bW), and uable, 3 toDO/] 21 January 1972, c14748, IN o 1es954, (S//NF), all inhelrn File 201-0896881, DO Records.(8//14)
13 For example, see Shirley Hazard, "TheLeague of Frightened Men," The New Republic,19 January 1980, pp. 17-20. (U)

14 Waldheim's 19 December 1980 reply to Solarz is located in the Austrian's 201 file.In his letter, Waldheim reaffirmed his family's anti-Nazi stance and maintained that he had gone to law school after his release from the German Army Solarz's letter to the DCI is not in the file,. For details about this correspondence, see Shirley Hazzard,Countenance of Muth: The United Nations and the Waldheim Case (New York, NY:Viking, 1990). (U)

15 See Hitz to Solarz, 31 December 1980,°LC 80-22484,1. in Waldheim, File 201-08PRAR1 flfl Pprewds. Elites letter, signed by C. had been had upon research conducted by C_ 3 Seealso C._ Memorandum for the Record,"Inquiry concerning UN Secretary General Waldheim," 9 March 1981, in Waldbeim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (11)

16 Deferred Telepoucb,to Washington, "Information on SecretaryGeneral oftIN " R December 1981,DCD/ c_ 14264, (67/NF), in Wald . 201-0896881, DO Records.(S//NF)

17 Deferrprl Telenouch, EUR/SAR to DCD, C. 'Information on Secretary General vvaidheim," 23 December  1981, C 103304, (S//NF), in Waldheim, Filellii-0896881, DO Records,(S/lINIF)

18 A summary of the OSI case against Waldheim is found in US Department of Justice, Criminal Division, In the Matter of Kurt Waldheim (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1987), pp. 1-3 (here after  cited as the Waldheim Report).Prepared in April 1987, the OSI report was not released until 1994. (U)

19 US Congress, House of Representatives,Subcommittee on Hunittri Rights and International Organizations of the Committeeon Foreign Relations, Allegations Concerning Dr. Kurt Waldheim, 99thCong., 2nd sess., 22 April 1986, p. 5. (U)

20 Gruber testified in the US Congress asto his relationship with Waldheim. SeeIbid., pp. 36-37, and Rosenbaum, Betrayal,pp. 174-175. (U)

21 Molden's account can be found in the Austrian government's "White Book,"which also examined Waldheim's wartime service and rebutted accusations that he was a war criminal. See Kurt Waldheim's Wartime Years—A Documentation (Vienna:Carl Gerald's Sohn, 1987). (U)

22 Hamilton to Casey, 24 March 1986;Solarz to Director, Office of General Counsel,27 March 1986, OGC t6-0134Q1 D'Amatoto Casey, 10 April 1986, ER 86-1625X;all in Waldheim, File:201-0896881, DORecords, (U)

23 For examples, see "HPSCI Chairman Hamilton's and Congressman Solarz's Request for Information on Kurt Waldheim,"25 April 1986, (S//NF); David D. Gries, Director of Congressional Affairs to Hamilton,25 April 1986, OCA 8.6-1361 (SUNF);Gries to D'Amato 29 A Dril 1986, OCA86-1394; C._ M Deputy Director for Senate Artairs to Bernard McMahon,Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 April 1986, OCA 86-1378,(S//NF); and Gries to Solarz, 1 May 1986,OCA 86-1425, (Shl\IF), all in Waldheim,File 201-0896881, DO Records. (S/NF)

24 See Solarz to c .... of Information Act unicer, a April 1986, F86-0431, and Gries to Solarz, 1 May 1986,OCA 86-1425, (S//NF). , both in Waldheirn,File1201-0896881, DO'Recorda„ (S'71\IF)

25 3 1 Z (Th ief, Operations Groupto L EPS/LG, "Waldheini, Kurt," 2b April 1986, DOR-02215, (SYNE),in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DORecords. (Si/NE)Report No. 4,

26 April 1945,originally filed as XARZ-8307 in Rome-X-2-PTS-113, XARX-8307, (S//NF), is now found in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DORecords. (S//NF)

27 The Agency refused to release the reportin response to a FOIA request by the World Jewish Congress. See Lee S. Strickland,Information and Privacy Coordinator toEli M. Rosenbaum, World Jewish Congress,9 June 1987, in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (U)

28 Solarz to the DCI, 23 October 1987, ER87-4677x, in Waldheim, File 201-0896881,DO Records. (U)Gries to Solarz, 16 November 1987, OCA87-5713. For back ground mnt p ri•il to Gries's reply, see C_ _J to Chief, EUR Division, "Congressman Solarz's Request for Information on Kurt Waldheim," [undated], (S), both in Waldheim,File 201-0896881, DO Records. (S)

30 "Austria Seeks Waldheim File," The Washington Post, 21 October 1987, p. A30.(U)

31 Lee S. Strickland, Privacy and Information Coordinator to DDA, et. al., "Inquiry from Embassy of Austria," 21 October 1987, (S), in Waldheim, File 201-0896881,DO Records. The Austrians probably were reacting to such press accounts as "New Links to a Nazi Past?," in Newsweek, 5 October 1987, p. 9. (5)

32 Austrian Embassy, Verbal Note, 22 October 1987, in Waldheim File 201-0896881 DO Records. (U)

33 C.. Chief, EUR Division,to Strickland, "Release of Information," 30October 1987, (S), in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (S)

34 Strickland to Amb. Rozanne L. Ridgway,Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 5 November 1987,(S//NF), in Waldheim, File 201-0896881,bo Records. The Austrian government used the 5.I.M.E. Report as a part of its"White Book" on Waldheim. (S)

35 International Commission of Historians,The Waldheim Report (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculaneum Press, 1993). (U)

36 Arthur Spiegelman, "British Blocking CIA from Releasing Waldheim Document,"Reuters, 2 March 1988. (IT

37 Cable, Headquarters to . C "Press Reports on Kurt Waldheim," 1 March 1988, Director 928635, (S), in Waldheim,File 201-0896881, DO Records. A few dayslater, Headquarters informed c_a that "British FC0 and MGv are now inclined to quote from and possibly even release 26 Apr 45 S.I.M.E. document asp art of Commando investigation and to counter increasingly fantastic press claims as to its content." The Agency told the British that "we cannot strongly object to British release, and that copy being released can even be sourced to USG (or if necessary [CIA]) archives since [CIA] has already surfaced in the press as holdor doc." See Cable, Headquarters to =."Waldheim Reports/Document," 5 March1988, Director 937491, (S/iNF), in Waldheim,Pile 201-0896881, DO Records. (S)

38 Solarz to DCI, 3 May 1988, ER 88-1931x;and Director of Congressional Affairs JohnL. Helgerson to Solarz, 8 June 1988, OCA88-1735 both in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (U)

39 Ministry of Defence, Review of the Resuls of Investigations Carried Out by the Ministry of Defence in 1986 into the fate of British Servicemen Captured in Greece and the Greek Islands between October 1943 arid October 1944 and the Involvement,If Any, of the Then Lieutenant Waldheirn (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989). See also Michael Evans, "Waldheim 'Not Linked to Shooting of Britoni,'" The Times (London), 11 October 1989, P. 24; Michael Evans, "MoD Report Clears Waldheim of Blame over War Murders," The Times (London), 18 October 1989, p. 8. (U)

40 A. M. Rosenthal, "The Waldheim File,"New York Tinws, 24 November 1989, P.A35. Herzstein presents his case in his book, Waldheim: The Missing Years (New York, NY: Arbor House/William Morrow,1988). (U)

41 Dennis Hevesi, "CIA Document Said to Contradict Waldheim," New York Times,30 November 1989, p. A13. (U)

42 Arthur Spiegelman, "CIA Held File on Waldheim War Role: Record Names Former UN Leader as eferman Intelligence Liaison," The Washington Post, 30November 1989, p. A51. (U)

43 Holtzman also wrote to President George H. W. Bush. (U)

44 Elizabeth Holtzman to DCI Robert Gates, 26 March 1992, copy of the letter in CIA History Staff files. (LI)

45 Adm. William (1 Studeman to Holtzman,10 August 1992, copy of the letter in CIA History Staff files, (U)

46 Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA is Planning to Unlock Many Long-Secret Nazi Files,"New York Times, 10 September 1992, P.B8. (U)

47 Ralph Blumenthal, "Nazi Hunter Says CIA Has File on Man Accused of War Crimes," New York Times, 17 September 199 2, p. B10. (U)

48 After his 1988 book, Herzstein continued  to research Waldheim's service in World War II and to speculate on his post war activities. See Robert E. Herzstein,"The Life of Dr. Kurt Waldheim, 1938-1948: Sources in the National Archives," in George 0. Kent, ed., Historians and Archivists:Essays in Modern German History and Archival Policy (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 1991), pp. 287-297, and Herzstein, "The Present State of the Waldheim Affair: Second Thoughts and New Direction," in Gunter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, eds., Austrian Historical Memoryry and National Identity (New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997). pp.116-134. (U)

49 A. M. Rosenthal, "The Waldheim File,"New York Times, 24 May 1994, p. A19. (U)

50 Ibid. Rosenthal's editorial evoked animmediate reaction in the CIA and asearch for information nertaining to theAustrian. See C Office of theDirector, Executive secretariat, toSA/DDO, "Commentary on NPw gnanor " 95May 1994, (S//NE), and C._Chief, External Inquiries Branch, 1MS, toe. , Office of the Director, Executiveoecietitriat, "Your Request dated25 May 1994," 26 May 1994, DOR-03886,(S//NF), both in Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (S//NF)

51 Carolyn B. Maloney, letter to colleagues,12 July 1994, copy of the letter in CIA History Staff files. (U)

52 A. M. Rosenthal, "The Waldheim Bill,"New York Tunes, 19 August 1994, p. A27.(U)

53 [ ]— Office of Congressional Affairs,to Director of Information Management,Information and Privacy Coordinator, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, and Litigation Division,Office of General Counsel. "War Crimes Disclosure Act (H.R. 4955)," 23 August 1994, OCA 94-2161, (no classification listed), copy in CIA History Staff files. (IU)

54 A. M. Rosenthal, "Ms. Maloney and Mr. Waldheim," New York Times, 25 June 1996, p. A21. (U)

55 "House Votes to Release Data on Nazis,"Washington Times, 25 September 1996,and "CIA is Obstacle in Hunt for Nazis,"Parade Magazine, 22 December 1996, p. 7.(U)

56 Public Law 105-246, "An Act to Amend Section 522 of Title 5, United States Code,and the National Security Act of 1947 to Require Disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act regarding Certain Persons,Disclose Nazi War Criminal Records without Impairing Any Investigation or Prosecution Conducted by the Department of Justice or Certain Intelligence Matters,and for Other Purposes," and Samuel R.Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Secretary of State, et al, "Implementation of the NaziWar Crimes Disclosure Act," 22 February 1999. Copies of both documents are located in CIA History Staff files. In 2000, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and its implementing directive were amended to add records pertaining to the Imperial Japanese government between 1931 and 1945. (U)

57 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Clinton Names Thomas Baer, Elizabeth Holtzman, and RichardBen-Veniste as Members of the NaziWar Crimes Records Interagency WorkingGroup," 11 January 1999. Copy located inCIA History Staff file. (U)

58 Nazi War Crimes and Japanese ImperialGovernment Records Interagency WorkingPress Release, "Nazi War Crimes DisclosureAct Prompts Rare Release of CIA'Name Files," 27 April 2001. Copy locatedin CIA History Staff files. (U)

59 Waldheim's name, for example, does notappear in the alphabetical section of the1951 master index card list of sources belongingto the 430th Counter IntelligenceCorps Detachment in Austria. For furtherdetails on this card filo (mi,rofilmed byCIA in 1951), sec a —4 Acting Chief,EE/A to Chief, RI, -Microfilm of SourcesRecords, 430" CIC Det., Austria (1951). 13October 1955," in DO Records, Job C.,Box 6, Folder 101, CIA Arcnivesana itecords Center. A CODV is also locatedin DO Reprds, Job C. .3 Box 1,Folder 1, CIA Archives ana rtecords Center.The eight reels of CIC microfilmedrecords are located in DO/IMS, CentralFiles, at CIA Headquarters. (S)

60 IWG Press Release, 27 April 2001. (U)

61 For an interesting perspective on the media's role in the Wfddheim case, see John R. Mapother, News as Entertainment:How Austria 3 Anti-Nazi President Became America's Favorite Nazi Culprit(Potomac, MD: privately published, 1999).Mapother, a retired CIA officer, took upWaldheim's cause in the United States andis a vocal critic of the decision to exclude him. (U)

62 FBIS translation, He rum Amberger and Daniela Kittner, "Unsuccessful Mission in Washington," Vienna Kurier, 24 May 2001.See also HIS translation, interview of Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero Waldner by Kurt Seinitz, "Initiative in the United States to Lift Watchlist' Decision against Waldheim," Vienna Neue Kronen Zeitung,20 May 2001. (U)

63 US Refuses to Take Waldhcim Off Nazi'Watch List," 23 May 2001, from website http://english.peopledaily.com . (U)

The Waldheim case represented a CIA failure on several levels that stretched over decades.

Waldheim was, in the agent's words, a'colorless bureaucrat.'

The CIA did not followup on fresh clandestine reports in 1981 that raised questions about Waldheim's whereabouts from 1941 to 1945.

Department of Justice findings prompted the Attorney General toplace Waldheim on the immigration WatchList in 1987."

The Agency provided details of the British World War II report to Congress, but refused to release it in its entirety to FOIA requesters.

Congressman Solarz demanded that the Agency inform him if the OSS had conducted any interrogations of Waldheim.

The CIA failed tofollow up on ActingDCI Studeman'spromise to locate andreview recordspertaining to Nazis.

Waldheim wasincluded in the CIA'sfirst release of Nazi"name file" holdings in2001.

The CIA simply cannot afford to let someone else with a reprehensible past rise to a position of global prominence.
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Hewel noted : “The Chief with the F¸hrer. ... On April 24, Canaris's lieutenant, Colonel Lahousen, interviewed General Kvaternik, the new .... Count Schulenburg had not been officially informed of “Barbarossa”; (Hans Krebs, his ... proposals ; but in Berlin this document had been toned down by Ribbentrop's own advisers,

PDF]Mr. Kurt Rosenow - IKN - Army
https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/MIHOF/biographies/Rosenow,%20Kurt.pdf
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became the first Director of the Berlin Documents Center (BDC), where the archive was held. Most of the collection had been prepared for destruction by the ...

Encyclopedia of the Holocaust - Page 192 - Google Books Result
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1135969507
Dr Robert Rozett, ‎Dr Shmuel Spector - 2013 - ‎HistoryThe BERLIN Documents Center is an archive that contains two sets of Holocaust materials. The first set was discovered by the UNITED STATES army in a paper ...

Research Resources - Philip Merrill College of Journalism
merrill.umd.edu/academics/phd-program/resources/
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Jul 11, 2016 - ... Collection; Textual records from most civilian agencies; Army records dating from World Wars I and II; Berlin Documents Center microfilm.


NARA's Washington, DC, Area Locations | National Archives
https://www.archives.gov/dc-metro
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... Presidential Materials; Motion picture, sound, and video records; John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection; Berlin Documents Center microfilm.

1 result in SearchWorks
https://searchworks.stanford.edu/?q=%22Germany+(Territory...Germany (Territory under Allied occupation, 1945-1955 : United States Zone). Berlin Documents Center. [S.l.] : Lithographed by the Adjutant General, OMGUS, ...

[PDF]Berlin Documents Center Documents Attached is a reproduction of ...
https://www.cia.gov/.../EGGEN,%20HANS%20WILHELM_0047.p...

CachedTranslate this pageBerlin Documents Center Documents. Attached is a reproduction of Berlin. Documents Center data on subject; the reproduction was made by them, by special ...

Cold War Saga - Page 126 - Google Books Result
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1608880095
Kempton Jenkins - 2010 - ‎HistoryIn Berlin, at the end of the war, the Allies had taken possession of the central Nazi party files, the Berlin Documents Center. With typical German efficiency, these ...

Germany, Index of Jews Whose German Nationality was Annulled by ...
search.ancestry.com/search/db.aspx?dbid=2027
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Name Index of Jews Whose German Nationality was Annulled by the Nazi Regime (Berlin Documents Center). NARA microfilm publication T355, 9 rolls.

The American Archivist
https://books.google.com/books?id=HDE4AAAAMAAJ
1946 - ‎ArchivesBencowitz. The Ministerial Collecting Center was moved to Berlin late last April and consolidated with the Berlin Documents Center under Col. Helm. In Bavaria ...

[PDF]Documentation Centers - Yad Vashem
www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%206274.pdf
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Holocaust. The Berlin Documents Center is an archive that contains two sets of. Holocaust materials. The first set was discovered by the United States army in.

Spymaster - Google Books Result
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1612342035
Ted Shackley, ‎Richard A. Finney - 2011 - ‎Biography & Autobiography... and bureaucratic language with which we had all become familiar from prolonged study at the Berlin Documents Center. These forged documents were then

U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis - Page 482 - Google Books Result
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0521617944
Richard Breitman - 2005 - ‎History... 101 The Battle for Rome, 77, 79 Bauer, Yehuda, 54 Baun, Hermann, 380-81, 383, 387, 389 BDC (Berlin Documents Center), 339, 350 Becher, Kurt, 57, 130, ...

Mission on the Rhine: "Reeducation" and Denazification in ...
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0226793583
James F. Tent - 1984 - ‎EducationThe Berlin Documents Center, which had finally begun to function with relative efficiency, could send back confirmation of whether any given student had or had

BDC - Berlin Document Center | AcronymAttic
www.acronymattic.com/Berlin-Document-Center-(BDC).htmlHow is Berlin Document Center abbreviated? BDC stands for Berlin Document Center. BDC is defined as Berlin Document Center frequently.

Epstein mss. - Indiana University Bloomington
www.indiana.edu/~liblilly/lilly/mss/index.php?p=epsteininv
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Scheibert, Peter; Schwabe, Klaus; Shirer, William; Snell, John; Sontag, Ray; Spuler, Bertold; Stone, Isaac: Berlin Documents Center; Sweet, Paul; Thimme, ...

Collection of Documents from the Estate of Isaac Stone – Part of the ...
https://www.kedem-auctions.com/.../collection-documents-estate-isaac-stone-–-part-pr...
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Large collection of documents, from the estate of Isaac Stone, head of the Berlin Documents Center and U.S. foreign service office, [1940s]. Isaac A. Stone was

Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical Warcrimes to ...
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0230506054
P. Weindling - 2004 - ‎HistoryNARA RG 238 Office of the Chief of Council for War Crimes, Berlin Branch, entry 202 box 2 NM 70 OMGUS to Berlin Documents Center, 9 October 1946.

Under the Bombs: The German Home Front, 1942-1945
https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0813109779
Earl R. Beck - 1999 - ‎History... German Labor Party, and T 580, records of the National Socialist German Labor Party from the Berlin Documents Center. There are some materials in Notes.

[PDF]Mel Gibson Invited to Museum - Museum of Jewish Heritage
www.mjhnyc.org/pressroom/documents/Gibsonletter.pdf
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From 19881994, Dr. Marwell served as the Executive Director of the Berlin Documents Center. In other capacities, Dr. Marwell served at the US Holocaust .

World War II Documents and Interrogations - JStor
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41963435No one could now conceal his membership in, and his service to, Hitler's party. These files became a part of the holdings of the. Berlin Documents Center, where

FOREIGN JOURNAL - The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/.../53f446fb-4064-416f-968a-62e08c6557a1/Jul 9, 1990 - ... is one of about 100 million pieces of paper in 30 million files in a massive underground complex called the Berlin Documents Center.

L. PETTERSON DIES - The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/.../77fabab3-fb95-411d-9d4a-0a146c273ea5/Jan 19, 1988 - Lucille M. Petterson,72, a former Central Intelligence Agency biographical analyst and retired director of the Berlin Documents Center, died of ...

Edith Lore Oestreicher (1918-2011) | WikiTree: The FREE Family Tree
www.wikitree.com/wiki/Oestreicher-11
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Apr 5, 2016 - ... Name Index of Jews Whose German Nationality Was Annulled by the Nazi Regime (Berlin Documents Center); Record Group: 242, National

Long-Lost Documents From Nuremberg Trials To Be Displayed ...
jspacenews.com › Europe
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Jan 27, 2014 - Designated Lot 72, the collection is believed to be from the estate of Isaac Stone, head of the Berlin Documents Center and US foreign service

Nuremberg Documents Discovered, Displayed and Up for Auction ...
www.chabad.org/.../Nuremberg-Documents-Discovered-Displayed-and-Up-for-Aucti...
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Jan 26, 2014 - In the latter part of the 1940s, Stone served in the U.S. Foreign Service and directed the Berlin Documents Center, established for the purpose

Historical Past vs. Political Present - Institute for Historical Review
www.ihr.org/jhr/v19/v19n6p12_butz.html
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Despite the lack of a Berlin Documents Center online search function, a development of recent years has been the availability of much information on the web.

Michael Witmann - Waffen-SS Signature? - Axis History Forum
forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=77894
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This is Wittmann's signature on his Lebenslauf (personal history record) in the Berlin Documents Center. You do not have the required permissions to view the

Who was a Nazi? : Facts about the membership procedure of the Nazi ...
www.worldcat.org/title/who-was-a-nazi-facts-about-the...of-the.../8559204
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Facts about the membership procedure of the Nazi party. [Germany (Territory under Allied occupation, 1945-1955 : U.S. Zone). Berlin Documents Center.]

AP Reporters and Researchers - Ibiblio
www.ibiblio.org/slanews/bsemonchefiles/Super_Searchers/herschaft.html
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Collection; still pictures; the Berlin Documents Center microfilm; and textual records from most civilian agencies and military records dating from World War 11.

Editor's Page,
www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1179/nam.1953.1.3.2241948 I was a member of the Berlin Documents Center, U. S.Army, in charge of captured German officialrecords and·Nazi party files, for organization, checking